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Goal representations play a key role in various psychological processes, including behavioral regulation,
self-perception and social understanding. Research on cognitive representations of action has identiﬁed individ-
ual differences in the general tendency to construe actions in terms of their goal (vs. movement parameters),
which can be reliably assessed with the Behavior Identiﬁcation Form (BIF). The aim of the present study was
to examine how individual differences in action identiﬁcation, as measured by the BIF, affect online processing
of action in a laboratory study. The main results showed that the level of action identiﬁcation predicted partici-
pants' performance in a task designed to implicitly assess people's automatic processing of action regarding goal
features. We discussed the possible role of impaired goal processing in psychological dysfunctions.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Mental representations of self or other behaviors are not just pro-
gressive reconstructions of what one is doing in the current situation;
the way people perceive and understand what they are doing (or
what others do) may also depend on how pre-existing mental repre-
sentations of actions are used for action processing. This kind of inter-
connection between action and cognition has been intensively
explored in the context of action identiﬁcation theory (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1985, 1987). Action identiﬁcation theory posits that any be-
havior can be identiﬁed within a cognitive hierarchy of meanings: the
higher-level meanings relate to the pursued goal and anticipated out-
comes; the lower-level meanings, however, represent instrumental
features and movement parameters (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985,
1987, 1989). Vallacher and Wegner suggested that the level at
which an action is identiﬁed may reﬂect the particular representation
(movement parameters vs. abstract goal) on the basis of which a
performed action is monitored and a perceived action is understood.
For example, identifying the act of “locking the door” as “putting a
key in the lock” shows that the instrumental representation is most
accessible, whereas identifying this act as “securing the house” re-
ﬂects the predominant accessibility of the goal representation.
When an act can be identiﬁed at both high and low levels (as in the
case of habitual actions), people adopt higher (more meaningful)
levels of action identiﬁcation over lower-level ones (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987); however, whenever an act becomes complex to pro-
cess (e.g., disruption, errors), people tend to adopt lower levels.
Nevertheless, the research on action identiﬁcation has shown not
only that there are individual differences in the ability to process fa-
miliar actions with a view to goal features, but also that such individ-
ual differences in action identiﬁcation may promote different modes
of action processing. Vallacher and Wegner developed a reliable tool
for assessing individual differences in action identiﬁcation, the Behav-
ior Identiﬁcation Form (BIF). By using this instrument, Vallacher and
Wegner (1989) showed that people tend to process action based
upon a preferential level of action identiﬁcation. Thus, there are peo-
ple who generally process action with abstract features in mind, that
is, regarding the purpose and implications of action (high-level
agents), while other people tend to identify actions at a uniformly
low level, that is, based on procedural aspects and motor subcompo-
nents (low-level agents). High-level agents are characterized by a
good ability to easily adopt an appropriate level of identiﬁcation for
different types of actions, while low-level agents may have more dif-
ﬁculties in adapting representations to action constraints. In the spe-
ciﬁc case of familiar actions, people who have a general tendency to
systematically adopt low-level identities seem to ﬁnd it difﬁcult in
maintaining their actions or understanding perceived actions with
goal representations in mind. This kind of difﬁculty can be assessed
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using the BIF, an instrument designed by Vallacher and Wegner
(1989) to measure individual differences in action identiﬁcation
level across an array of routine actions. Each item of the BIF consists
of an action followed by two alternatives or “identities,” one of
which is lower (i.e., movement-focused description of action) and
one higher in level (i.e., goal focused). For example, the act of “locking
the door” is followed by (a) “putting a key in the lock” (low-level ac-
tion identiﬁcation) and (b) “securing the house” (high-level action
identiﬁcation). For each action, participants must choose the alterna-
tive that best describes the action for them. The number of high-level
identities chosen deﬁnes the subjects' level of action identiﬁcation.
By using the BIF, Vallacher and Wegner showed that the preferen-
tial level of action identiﬁcation is related to distinct modes of action
processing. Because performing habitual actions with unavailable or
irrelevant goal representations may simply disorganize the action
ﬂow, people characterized by a low level of action identiﬁcation,
that is, mainly focused on the movement parameters and mechanistic
aspects of action, are more prone to ineffectiveness in everyday ac-
tions (e.g., emergence of new courses of action, more attention fo-
cused on details of performance, doubts about whether the action
has been completed; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). They may also
have difﬁculties in understanding events regarding goal features
(e.g., Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009). By contrast, by focusing on
the abstract goals and implications of behaviors, people with a high
level of action identiﬁcation tend to have greater overall efﬁciency
in everyday actions (e.g., less disruption, fewer resources needed
and better goal completion in everyday behaviors) and have greater
facility in perceiving other's intention and goal.
It is generally acknowledged that humans are spontaneously attuned
to a high-level understanding of events and behaviors (e.g., Csibra,
Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson,
2005; Heider & Simmel, 1944; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987; Zacks, 2004). However, there are low- and high-level
agents, who may differ in their ability to understand behavior in terms
of its underlying goal. One possibility is that the level of action identiﬁca-
tion may be related to a more basic cognitive process responsible for an
automatic orientation towards comprehensive understanding of actions.
Even though people can consciously activate or build goal representa-
tions (e.g., through verbalization, conscious inferences or conscious ef-
fort to remember a goal), we assume that, in everyday behavioral
situations, the limited resources of the cognitive system do not allow
them to systematically process goal-related features at a conscious
level (i.e., for behavioral regulation or for understanding others' actions).
Thus, it is possible that people with a chronic low level of action identi-
ﬁcationmay be characterized by an impairment of the automatic activa-
tion or accessibility of goal representations. It is often suggested that
peoplewith a chronic low level of action identiﬁcationmay be character-
ized by an undermined ability to activate or keep goal representations in
mind during action processing (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, &
Arps, 1984).
To sum up, although there are various ways of construing and reg-
ulating one's action or understanding that of others', people seem to
identify their actions based on a preferential level, which reﬂects
the internal representation (goal vs. movements) that is generally ac-
tivated during action processing. Vallacher and Wegner developed a
reliable tool for assessing such individual differences in basic action
processing, the BIF, which has been related to different modes of ac-
tion processing in everyday behaviors. The current study aimed to ex-
amine how the level of action identiﬁcation affects action processing
in a laboratory experiment designed to assess the automaticity of goal
activation during action processing. According to Vallacher and
Wegner, people with a chronic low level of action identiﬁcation
may be characterized by difﬁculties activating or accessing goal rep-
resentations during action processing. This assumption will be tested
by more directly examining the extent to which the difference
between low- and high-level agents can be construed in terms of dif-
ferential degrees of automatic activation of goal representations dur-
ing action processing.
This issue can be examined by using a task designed to assess au-
tomatic goal inferences. In this task, inspired by Hassin et al. (2005),
participants read short sentences after which they perform a lexical
decision task; that is, they see a string of letters (test word) for
which they must rapidly determine whether it is a word or not.
There are two kinds of experimental sentences: those that imply a
goal and those that do not. The test word, in both cases, is a goal
that is not explicitly mentioned in the sentence. The authors
suggested that, if goals are automatically inferred, then their accessi-
bility should increase after reading goal-implying sentences, thus
making the judgment task easier. Consistently with this assumption,
Hassin et al. (2005) demonstrated such a goal effect by observing
that responses after goal-implying sentences were faster than re-
sponses after control sentences. If the level of action identiﬁcation is
related to the degree of accessibility of goal representations, then
we could expect that the level of agency would be related to the
strength of the goal effect on response latencies.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Seventy-seven undergraduates (32 males and 45 females) from
the University of Liège, aged between 18 and 30, took part in the
study. Participants were randomly recruited from various faculties
and schools of the university; they were not compensated for their
participation. Their mean age was 21.81 years (SD=2.26 years).
2.2. Apparatus and measures
The goal activation task was programmed in the Matlab environ-
ment; we used the same task administration and scoring methods de-
scribed in Hassin et al. (2005). In this task, a series of situations were
presented one by one to participants, who, after each situation, had to
perform a lexical decision task. These situations are sentences depicting
basic behavioral contexts. There are two types of experimental situa-
tions: situations involving a speciﬁc goal (e.g., The woman connects
the garden hose and walks towards the car; the goal=washing the
car) and control situations, which contained the same words as situa-
tions involving a goal but associated in a different way so that they ac-
tivate a different semantic ﬁeld (e.g., the woman walks to the car and
throws the garden hose into it). Each situation was immediately
followed by a lexical decision task, which involved presenting strings
of letters for which participants had to rapidly determine whether
theywerewords or not. In fact, all the experimental situationswere sys-
tematically followed by the presentation of a real word. These test
words represent the speciﬁc goal that is implicitly indicated in each
goal-implying situation (e.g., wash). Words presented in the lexical de-
cision tasks following goal-implying sentences and their corresponding
control situations are the same. We expected, as demonstrated by
Hassin et al. (2005), that reaction times for test words would be faster
when preceded by goal-implying sentences than when preceded by
control situations. In order to prevent participants from guessing the
real purpose of the task, the task also contained distractor situations
that described an action (e.g., the woman puts the pie in the car and
goes to the party; the woman locks the door and puts the key in her
purse). Lexical decision tasks following each of these distractor situa-
tions consisted in presenting either a word (unrelated to any of the sit-
uations presented in this study) or a non-word.
In total, there were 7 situations involving a goal, 7 control situations
that had the same semantic context but referred to a different goal and
74 distractor situations. Each sentence remained on the screen for 3 s,
and then a row of asterisks appeared for 500 ms, followed by a word
260 S. Belayachi, M. Van der Linden / Acta Psychologica 142 (2013) 259–264
Author's personal copy
or a non-word (i.e., lexical decision task). Participants had to press a
left-hand key for letter strings recognized as words and a right-hand
key for non-words. All the 14 experimental situations were followed
by a lexical decision task on a word (i.e., speciﬁc goal); 30 of the
distractor situations were also followed by a word, while 44 distractor
situations were followed by a non-word. The lexical decision task was
not limited in time; the reaction times and the number of correct re-
sponses were computed for each test word of the lexical decision task.
Finally, the interstimulus interval was 2 s after a participant
responded. Items were presented in two parts, separated by a
1-minute break. The ﬁrst part of the task consisted in presenting ei-
ther the 7 situations involving a goal or the 7 control situations, in
addition to 37 distractor situation conditions (15 followed by a
word and 22 followed by a non-word in the lexical decision task);
in the second part, the 7 remaining experimental situations (the con-
trol or the goal situations) and the other half of the distractor situa-
tions were presented. For each part of the task, the order of item
presentation was randomly determined at the beginning of the
task. Two versions of the task were created: in the ﬁrst version
(goal/control), goal-implying sentences were presented ﬁrst (in
part 1); in the second version (control/goal), situations involving a
goal were presented after the control situations (in the second part
of the task). This conﬁguration allows one to avoid certain problems
related to the many similarities between the two types of sentences.
Indeed, because the lexemic contents of the goal-implying sentences
and their corresponding control situations are so similar, partici-
pants could be aware of the similarities if these sentences are
presented close together in time. Participants might also notice
that the same goal word is presented twice, in sentences containing
the same words. To prevent such problems, the goal-implying
sentences and their corresponding control situations were presented
in two separate blocks.
2.2.1. Response latency
Average response latency was calculated for the test words that
followed the goal-implying sentences and the control sentences. In-
correct responses on test words (i.e., words erroneously recognized
as non-words) were excluded from the analyses (there were 1.5% of
incorrect responses in the control condition and 0.6% of incorrect re-
sponses in the goal condition). Response latencies that deviated more
than 3 SDs from the overall mean were also excluded from the anal-
yses. We then computed the average reaction time for both the goal
condition (RTgoal) and the control condition (RTcontrol).
2.2.2. Goal effect measure
We also used the difference in RTs between the two conditions to
quantify the amount of the decrease in response latency due to the
prior goal-implying sentences (i.e., the overall effect of goal). For
each participant, we computed a proportional index, deﬁned as the
percentage difference between the participant's mean RT in the goal
condition and the participant's mean RT in the control condition
(i.e., [RTgoal−RTcontrol] /RTcontrol∗100). Values for the proportional
index ranged from −34.62 to 18.96.
2.2.3. BIF
Participants completed the French version of the BIF (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1989). The BIF is a one-dimensional scale designed tomeasure
individual differences in action identiﬁcation level (i.e., level of personal
agency) across an array of routine actions. Each item of the BIF consists
of an action followed by two alternatives or “identities,” one of which is
lower (i.e., movement-focused description of action) and one higher in
level (i.e., goal-focused). For each action, participants must choose the
alternative that best describes the action for them. The number of
high-level identities chosen deﬁnes the subjects' level of action iden-
tiﬁcation. In a recent replication study (Belayachi & der Linden,
submitted for publication), the psychometric properties of the
23-item French version of the BIF have been found to be comparable
to those of the original version (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). In the
present study, the scale was shown to be reliable, with a Cronbach's
alpha of .91.
2.3. Design
All participants were presented with both types of experimental
situations (goal-implying and control sentences). Hence, the type of
sentence (control vs. goal) constituted a within-participant factor.
To control for order effects, half of the participants were given the
goal/control version, and the other half received the control/goal
order. Order (control/goal vs. goal/control) therefore constituted a
between-participant factor. As well, participants' level of action
identiﬁcation (high-level vs. low-level) was measured with the BIF
and used as a between-participant factor.
2.4. Procedure
Informed consent was obtained from all participants following a
full explanation of the experimental procedure. Detailed written
and oral instructions explained that they would participate in a
study of language comprehension. Participants were told that they
would be shown letter strings on the screen and that we were inter-
ested in their ability to determine whether these sets of letters were
words or not. They were further informed that we wished to assess
whether their ability to make such judgments would be facilitated
or impaired by the previous presentation of verbal material. Partici-
pants performed the experimental task and completed the BIF (as
well as other questionnaires unrelated to the present study) in an in-
dividual testing session; the order of administration of the task and
the questionnaires was counterbalanced across participants. Finally,
participants were debriefed after the completion of the entire proto-
col. This debrieﬁng revealed that none of the participants realized
the true nature of the task or consciously inferred goals from the
situations.
3. Results
Table 1 summarizes the sample's mean scores on the BIF, the goal
effect index and the average response latency for the test words that
followed the seven goal-implying sentences (RT-goal) and the seven
control sentences (RT-control).
3.1. Group comparisons
To directly address the question of whether low-level agents are
characterized by a problem affecting automatic goal activation, com-
pared to high-level agents, we divided the overall sample into two
groups – high on level of action identiﬁcation (high-level agents,
n=42) and low on level of action identiﬁcation (Low-level agents,
n=35) – on the basis of the median sample value for the BIF measure
(Mdn=15). The mean BIF score was 11.26 (SD=2.67) in the
low-level agent group and 17.83 (SD=2.26) in the high-level agent
Table 1
Mean scores and SDs for the action identiﬁcation scores, RTs in the goal and control
conditions, goal effect measure in the overall sample and Pearson correlations between
action identiﬁcation and the three measures of the task.
Mean SD Correlation with the
BIF
r p
BIF score 14.84 4.10 / /
RTcontrol 705 174 0.11 0.350
RTgoal 644 169 −0.05 0.647
Goal effect measure −8.01 11.65 −0.31 0.007
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group (see Table 2 for further details). The dependent measure of in-
terest was the average response latency for the test words that
followed the seven goal-implying sentences (RTgoal) and the seven
control sentences (RTcontrol).
In order to control for the order effect, the RTs were entered in a 2
(type of sentence: control vs. goal – within-participants factor)×2
(order: control/goal vs. goal/control)×2 (group: high-level agents vs.
low-level agents – between-participants factors) ANOVA. This analysis
yielded a statistically signiﬁcant main effect of type of sentence, F(1,
73)=32.14, pb .001 (η2p=0.31), suggesting that responses to the
test words were signiﬁcantly faster when preceded by goal-implying
sentences than when preceded by control sentences. There was also a
main effect of order, F(1, 73)=5.14, p=.026 (η2p=0.07), suggesting
that participants who received the goal sentences ﬁrst were generally
faster (M=636; SD=26) than those who received the control
sentences ﬁrst (M=717; SD=25), although therewere no interactions
between order and type of sentence [F(1, 73)=.04, p=.849] or be-
tween order and group [F(1, 73)=.71, p=.401]. Finally, there was no
main effect of group, F(1, 73)=.55, p=.461, while the interaction be-
tween type of sentence and group was found to be statistically signiﬁ-
cant, F(1, 73)=4.49, p=.037 (η2p=0.06) (see Fig. 1). There was no
triple interaction, F(1, 73)=1.58, p=.213. Paired t-tests performed
separately for each group on RTs across the two conditions (goal vs.
control) revealed that RTs were shorter in the goal condition than in
the control condition for high-level agents, t(41)=−5.67, pb .001
(Cohen's d=− .87) and, to a lesser extent, for low-level agents as
well, t(34)=−2.37, p=.024 (Cohen's d=− .40). We then performed
t-tests on RTs in the control and goal conditions and on the goal ef-
fect measure (i.e., the proportional index: the percentage difference
between the mean RT in the goal condition and the mean RT in the
control condition) across the two groups. These analyses showed
that there were no group differences in RTs in the control condition,
t(75)=−0.31, p=.757, or the goal condition, t(75)=−1.50, p=
.139; however, high-level agents had a higher overall beneﬁt of
goal than low-level agents on the proportional index, t(75)=−2.19,
p=.031 (Cohen's d=.50).
3.2. Correlation analyses
We then explored the association between measures on the task
and level of action identiﬁcation. Table 1 summarizes the correlations
between the level of action identiﬁcation and the three measures of
the task (i.e., RTs in the goal and control conditions and the goal effect
index). These analyses revealed that there were no correlations be-
tween BIF scores and RTs in the goal and control conditions. However,
there was a statistically signiﬁcant association between the level of ac-
tion identiﬁcation and the overall effect of goal (asmeasured by propor-
tional indexes), suggesting that a higher level of action identiﬁcation is
related to a greater difference between RTgoal and RTcontrol (see
Fig. 2).
4. Discussion
This article examines the relationship between the BIF, which as-
sesses individual differences in action identiﬁcation, and on-line pro-
cessing of action in a laboratory experiment. The results can be
summarized as follows. First, the results suggested that the French
version of the BIF is a reliable instrument with psychometric proper-
ties similar to those observed in the original version (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1989). In addition, scores on the BIF were normally distrib-
uted, which supports the idea that the preferential level of action
identiﬁcation is distributed along a continuum ranging from extreme-
ly concrete (i.e., mainly based on mechanistic aspects and movement
parameters) to extremely abstract (i.e., predominantly based on
goal-related features). In addition, there was no gender effect on the
level of action identiﬁcation.
More importantly, we used a lexical decision task, in which the
test words were goal concepts that had not appeared in the target
sentences. In line with previous ﬁndings (Hassin et al., 2005), the re-
sults show that participants' judgments in the lexical decision task
came more easily after goal-implying scenarios than after control sce-
narios (i.e., RTs for test words were faster when preceded by goal-
implying sentences than when preceded by control situations). This
may be due to the fact that automatic online inferences make goal
representations more accessible. As expected, scores on the BIF
Table 2
Mean scores and SDs for the action identiﬁcation scores, RTs in the goal and control
conditions and the difference between these two conditions for each action identiﬁca-
tion group.
High-level agents n=42 Low level agents n=35




BIF score 17.83 (2.26) 11.26 (2.67)
RTcontrol 700 (165) 712 (186)
RTgoal 618 (137) 676 (199)























Fig. 1. Response latency as function of the type of sentence (control vs. goal), for each
group (low-level vs. high-level of action identiﬁcation). Error bars represent standard
errors.
Goal effect (proportional index)































Fig. 2. The relationship between the level of action identiﬁcation (i.e., BIF scores) and
the overall beneﬁt of goal (as measured by proportional indexes).
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were found to be correlated with a greater goal effect (i.e., the
amount of difference in reaction time from the control condition to
the goal condition).
When we compared participants with a high level of action identiﬁ-
cation to those with a low level of action identiﬁcation, we found a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant interaction between the level of action identiﬁcation
and the type of sentence preceding the test word. Further analyses
revealed that there were no differences between the two groups in
terms of participants' RTs in the control condition or in the goal condi-
tion; however, the overall effect of goal (i.e., goal effect index) was
signiﬁcantly higher for the high-level group than for the low-level
group. These results suggest that goal-implying sentences enhanced
the speed of processing of the subsequent test word (i.e., explicit goal)
more markedly among participants with a preferential high level of
action identiﬁcation than in participants from the low-level group.
By and large, our results are consistent with Vallacher andWegner's
conceptualization of action identiﬁcation levels and their suggestion
that individual differences in action identiﬁcation may imply different
modes of action processing. Our results support the idea that level of ac-
tion identiﬁcation is related to the automatic activation of goal repre-
sentations during action processing. Indeed, high-level agents may
appear to activate goal representations faster when processing verbal
materials related to actions than their low-level counterparts. This
could suggest that, compared to high-level agents, low-level agents
are characterized by increased difﬁculty inmaintaining/accessing active
goal representations. Furthermore, difﬁculties in maintaining/accessing
activated goal representations could explain why low-level agents are
more subject to chronic disruption and action slips in everyday behav-
ioral situations, especially action failures involving the loss of a pursued
goal (e.g., forgettingwhy onewent to the kitchen) or a failure to encode
an already achieved goal (e.g., did I close the door?). It should be noted
that participants in this study had to process actions performed by other
people. One could argue that such stimulimay prevent us from drawing
any inference about how low-level agents process their own behaviors.
However, numerous theoretical and empirical data indicate that the
way people perceive others' actions depends on the same action repre-
sentations involved in self-performed actions (e.g., the mirror neuron
system; for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Furthermore, it
has been suggested that the action monitoring system, which allows
one to guide and control an action until goal completion, may also un-
derlie the processing of actions performed by others (Shmuelof &
Zohary, 2007).
Overall, action identiﬁcation may be a key feature of the cognitive
aspects of human action. One factor that is directly relevant to the
clinical psychology of action is the potential for deregulation of an im-
paired process of action identiﬁcation. From this perspective, the ac-
tion identiﬁcation dimension could have several implications for
understanding and treating some behavioral and psychological dys-
functions. Based on reported evidence that the level of action identi-
ﬁcation may inﬂuence symptoms and mechanisms implied in various
psychopathological symptoms, Watkins (2011) suggested that defec-
tive action identiﬁcation may be a transdiagnostic process across psy-
chological disorders. Indeed, the level of action identiﬁcation has
been implicated in several psychopathological symptoms, including
obsessive–compulsive behaviors (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009;
Dar & Katz, 2005), autistic traits (Marsh et al., 2010) and impulsivity
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). For example, people with checking
symptoms have been related to a low level of action identiﬁcation
(Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009). A lack of goal identiﬁcation in
checking individuals could explain the diminished sense of goal com-
pletion they frequently experience and their need to repeat actions
regardless of the obvious achievement of the goal. Low-level action
identiﬁcation has also been related to autistic traits (Marsh et al.,
2010). This relationship has been interpreted as consistent with peo-
ple with autism's problems interpreting and inferring other people's
goals and intentions (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986). Thus, action
identiﬁcation may be a key feature of both obsessive–compulsive
symptoms and autism spectrum disorder. This is consistent with the
idea that some overlaps exist between these two sets of symptoms
(Fischer-Terworth & Probst, 2009). Nevertheless, action identiﬁcation
may be differentially affected in these two groups of psychopatholog-
ical symptoms: while action identiﬁcation may be connected to
self-regulation (i.e., self-action processing) in obsessive–compulsive
symptoms, low-level action identiﬁcation in people with autism spec-
trum may speciﬁcally concern the social domain (i.e., social cognitive
processes). Action identiﬁcation could also be biased toward an ab-
stract level that is overly high, as in depression. Watkins (2011), for
example, proposed that an extremely high identiﬁcation of negative
events may be connected to depressed mood.
In conclusion, this research focused on action identiﬁcation, a dis-
positional tendency which is known to inﬂuence the cognitive pro-
cessing of action. According to the action identiﬁcation theory,
low-level agents may be characterized by action representations
that are predominantly based on concrete, mechanistic details and
by an increased difﬁculty in activating/maintaining goal representa-
tions during action processing. By using the goal activation paradigm,
this study provides evidence only that goal representations are less
readily available in low-level agents than in high-level agents.
Hence, there is still a need to explore the extent to which low-level
agents, as compared to high-level agents, are also characterized by
the increased activation of low-level representations (i.e., mechanis-
tic details, instrumental aspects of action). This issue could be exam-
ined by using a modiﬁed version of the goal activation task, in which
test words could refer either to the goal implied by the situation or
the means and movement parameters related to that situation. By
using such a task, one might expect an interaction between the
level of agency and the priming of test words in the lexical decision
task. Future works are also needed in order to examine the effect of
action identiﬁcation on action processing during on-line processing
of one's own actions.
Empirical and theoretical evidences suggest that impaired action
identiﬁcation could be a transdiagnostic factor (Watkins, 2011),
which is differentially affected across various psychopathological
states. Future studies should be conducted in order to better grasp
the connection between the level of action identiﬁcation and certain
psychological disorders. More speciﬁcally, it is advisable to not only
identify the bias toward a particular level of action identiﬁcation
that may characterize some psychological symptoms but also specify
the content domain that could be problematic (e.g., social domain in
autism, personal life events in depression, and personal standards in
perfectionism) (for a detailed framework for this topic, see Watkins,
2011).
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